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PastCritical◐Partly contained

StablR's EURR and USDR depeg after attacker takes over 1-of-3 minting multisig with a stolen key

StablR EURR and USDR stablecoins and holders

On 23-24 May 2026 an attacker used the compromised private key of one signer on StablR's 1-of-3 minting multisig to add themselves as owner, replace the other owners and mint 8.35M USDR and 4.5M EURR, about $13.5M face value. They dumped about $10.4M of it on DEXs for ETH, with early net proceeds estimated at $2.8M, pushing USDR as low as $0.40 and EURR to about $0.85. ZachXBT said he helped freeze a six-figure sum.

Why this severity: $2.8M reported stolen, only partly contained.

Started
May 23, 2026
Closed
May 24, 2026
Chains
Ethereum
Reported stolen
$2.8M

Follow this incident

Indicators · never visit or send to these

  • 0x09be1a36c2d7f9909eb3d6f9184c6e46a12b0aca

What to do now

  • Don't buy the depeg expecting a quick recovery; wait for StablR's official recovery details.
  • The attacker also used admin powers to blacklist and burn some holders' tokens; check your balance and contact StablR only through official channels.

Stay safe

Am I affected?

If you held EURR or USDR, or provided liquidity in pools containing them, around 23-24 May 2026.

What to do now

  • Don't buy the depeg expecting a quick recovery; wait for StablR's official recovery details.
  • The attacker also used admin powers to blacklist and burn some holders' tokens; check your balance and contact StablR only through official channels.

How to avoid this

  • Check a stablecoin's mint controls before holding it: a 1-of-3 multisig means one stolen key can mint without limit.
  • For teams: use higher signing thresholds, hardware-backed keys, timelocks on owner changes and hard mint caps.

Timeline 2

  1. StablR acknowledged an exploit on X about eight hours after on-chain activity stopped; Blockaid attributed it to one signer's compromised key on a 1-of-3 multisig.

    Source
  2. ZachXBT flagged the exploit at 9:46 PM ET after the attacker minted 8.35M USDR and 4.5M EURR through the minting multisig.

    Source
News & write-ups ›1

How this method works

A private key or seed phrase ends up somewhere readable: code on GitHub, an env file, a hacked server or cloud notes. Bots find it within minutes. Read about leaked private keys and seed phrases →

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