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SPL token-account ownership reassignment used to fake deposits at a Solana custodian

Liminal Custody Solana deposit monitoring (custodian, exchange-style deposit addresses)

In February 2026 Liminal Custody's monitoring caught two low-value attempts that used SetAuthority to reassign an attacker's temporary SPL token account to a customer's deposit address after a net-zero transfer, so systems that look up owners through RPC could credit a deposit that never happened. Liminal says no erroneous credit occurred and no customer funds were affected. Exchanges, custodians and payment apps on Solana should verify the expected associated token account and real balance increases before crediting.

Why this severity: A warning with little reported loss.

Started
Feb 1, 2026
Closed
Mar 31, 2026
Chains
Solana

Follow this incident

At risk

  • Liminal Custody Solana deposit monitoring (custodian, exchange-style deposit addresses)
  • Solana wallets

What to do now

  • Review recent deposits where a SetAuthority instruction touched an account that also appeared in a transfer, and check that each credited token account is the expected associated token account for the user and mint.

Stay safe

Am I affected?

This targets services that credit Solana token deposits (exchanges, custodians, payment apps), not ordinary wallet users. If your service decides who owns a token account by asking an RPC node for its current owner, it may be exposed.

What to do now

Review recent deposits where a SetAuthority instruction touched an account that also appeared in a transfer, and check that each credited token account is the expected associated token account for the user and mint.

How to avoid this

Parse every instruction before crediting, recompute the expected associated token account address instead of trusting RPC owner data, credit only on a verified net balance increase, and delay credits for new or unverified deposit addresses.

Timeline 2

  1. Liminal publishes a write-up of the 'false top-up' technique and says it deployed instruction-level filtering and ATA validation.

    Source
  2. During February, Liminal Custody's SOC detects and neutralises two low-value SPL token-account ownership reassignment attempts (exact days not published).

    Source
News & write-ups ›1

How this method works

A Solana transaction quietly hands ownership of your token accounts (or your whole account) to the attacker, so the tokens are no longer yours to move. Read about token account ownership change →

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