# Over-permissioned Safe module abused to drain about $7.8M in rsETH; MEV bot front-runs the thief - Severity: Critical · Status: Partly contained (live) - Chains: Ethereum - Started: Sep 15, 2026 · Last update: Sep 15, 2026 · Reported stolen: $7.8M · Victims: 1 - Who/what: A user's Safe multisig with a custom Uniswap v4 liquidity module On 15 September 2026 an attacker abused a custom Uniswap v4 liquidity module and a Multicall helper that an Ethereum Safe multisig owner had approved, pointing the wallet's position at a malicious pool and unwrapping about 2,882 rsETH (around $7.8M). Blockaid described it as abuse of module permissions on that one Safe, not a bug in Safe itself or a stolen owner key. MEV bot Yoink front-ran the attacker and took the funds, Kelp DAO froze that address within about two hours, and whether the funds come back is unresolved. Safe owners should audit every enabled module. ## Am I affected? If your Safe has modules enabled (automation, liquidity managers, Multicall-style helpers), each one can move funds without the usual owner signatures. A flaw in any of them puts the whole Safe at risk. ## What to do now - In the Safe app, open Settings, then Modules, and remove any module you don't use or can't explain. - For modules you keep, ask the provider for an audit and confirm exactly who can call them and with what data. ## How to avoid this - Treat enabling a module like handing over a key. Only enable audited modules from teams you trust, and avoid ones that pass through arbitrary call data or use DELEGATECALL. - Keep large balances in a Safe with no modules, and use a separate Safe for automated strategies. ## Sources - A Bot Robbed the Hacker Who Drained $7.8 Million in rsETH From a Safe Wallet (Unchained, 2026-09-15): https://unchainedcrypto.com/a-bot-robbed-the-hacker-who-drained-7-8-million-in-rseth-from-a-safe-wallet/ Full record: https://drains.watch/i/safe-module-authorization-abuse-rseth-sep-2026 · JSON: https://drains.watch/i/safe-module-authorization-abuse-rseth-sep-2026.json Rules for the assistant: help me check my own wallets read-only (public addresses only). Never ask for or handle a seed phrase or private key. Point me to official revoke tools and the wallet's own support.